Otherwise, the chief magistrate might become irresponsible. 75-77 (Hamilton), Section XII: Judiciary: Federalist No. Yet it is always justifiable to reason from the practice of a government, till its propriety has been constitutionally questioned. If he really has the right of nominating, his authority is in this respect equal to that of the President, and exceeds it in the article of the casting vote. The first need was "due dependence on the people"; the second, due responsibility. Are you sure you want to remove #bookConfirmation# The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), Section I: General Introduction: Federalist No. HAMILTON: To the People of the State of New York: I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the plan of the convention. The president was also to be the commander-in-chief of all regular United States military forces and of the state militias when called into national service. All rights reserved. Yet these two different approaches provide insight into two different aspects of the constitution, allowing both to become important parts of this philosophic document. With regard to impeachment, the President is on similar ground as the Governor of New York and worse ground than the Governors of Virginia and Delaware. But since a president was to be elected every four years, he could not possibly become a "perpetual and hereditary prince" like the despised and "tyrannical" King George III of Britain.
79 (Hamilton), Section XII: Judiciary: Federalist No. Section I: General Introduction: Federalist No. Federalist Papers Summary 69. He not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices.
The governor of New York may also prorogue the legislature of this State for a limited time; a power which, in certain situations, may be employed to very important purposes. 2 (John Jay), Section I: General Introduction: Federalist No. A president could not shield others from impeachment and conviction for similar acts. The king of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute negative upon the acts of the two houses of Parliament. The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and other public ministers. 67 (Hamilton), Section XI: Need for a Strong Executive: Federalist No. The president was to have the power to grant pardons and reprieves for offences against the United States, "except in cases of impeachment." Four years would be long enough, but not too long. Supposedly then the Governor could be involved in a conspiracy and if exposed prior to actual activities pardon all accomplices. The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the supreme head and governor of the national church! The power of the President, in respect to pardons, would extend to all cases, EXCEPT THOSE OF IMPEACHMENT. A man having served four years as president would have more knowledge of statecraft and the inner workings of the government than one who had not. In Chapter 74, among other requisite powers, the president was to be commander-in-chief of all regular United States military forces and of the state militias "when called into the actual service of the United States." 69-74 (Hamilton), Section XI: Need for a Strong Executive: Federalists No. Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps be a greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise against the public liberty, than the mere prospect of an exemption from death and confiscation, if the final execution of the design, upon an actual appeal to arms, should miscarry? In this article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor. i., page 262, expresses it, by the Long Parliament of Charles I. but by the statute the 13th of Charles II., chap. “What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other?” In other word there is no similarity between the King’s powers and the President’s. The one can confer no privileges whatever; the other can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. 78 (Hamilton), Section XII: Judiciary: Federalist No. and any corresponding bookmarks? 82 (Hamilton), Section XII: Judiciary: Federalist No. Federalists No. 2 Vide Blackstone's "Commentaries,'' vol i., p. 257. This rather lengthy paper down plays the power of the President of the United States by comparing his powers to that of the King of Great Britain and in some instances to the governors of various States. In Chapter 73, the vigor of the executive branch depended on adequate provision for its support, to be determined by Congress. In these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude between HIM and a king of Great Britain, who is an HEREDITARY monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy between HIM and a governor of New York, who is elected for THREE years, and is re-eligible without limitation or intermission. 23-29 (Hamilton), Section V: Powers of Taxation: Federalists No. Hamilton ends the paper with a question. The most material points of difference are these: First. A President of the Union, on the other hand, though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted in the ordinary course of law, could shelter no offender, in any degree, from the effects of impeachment and conviction. In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The truth is, on the contrary, that his prerogative, in this respect, is immenmorial, and was only disputed, "contrary to all reason and precedent,'' as Blackstone vol. A constitutional amendment (XXII) now limits a president's tenure to two terms, with one exception: If he should succeed to the office following the death or removal of the president, and serve less than two years of that term, he may then be elected for an additional two terms. To exclude a president from seeking to succeed himself might well result in the "fatal inconveniences of fluctuating councils and a variable policy.". 80 (Hamilton), Section XII: Judiciary: Federalist No. 21 (Hamilton), Section III: Disadvantages of Existing Government: Federalist No. He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure; and has the disposal of an immense number of church preferments. 12 (Hamilton), Section II: Advantages of Union: Federalist No.